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Background
In consumer lending, portfolio managers typically have access to a scorecard used to 
forecast default probability for each applicant. Scorecards are built using historical data 
on loan accounts and their respective performance data. The inputs into the score-
card include financial, demographic and other personal information about each appli-
cant. The output of the scorecard is a real-valued score for each applicant, which can 
then be mapped to a probability of default [see Hand and Henley (1997) for scorecard 
construction]. Similarly, portfolio managers may have access to a scorecard forecast-
ing applicant responses to offers. In turn, forecasts of default probabilities and response 
probabilities serve as inputs to business metric functions such as expected profit.
In setting loan prices (or loan interest rates), loan portfolio managers face a trade-off 
between response and risk. Consumers prefer lower loan rates and hence lower loan 
rates results in higher take-up of the products, but lower profits for each account. Loan 
pricing is further complicated by the phenomenon of adverse selection in which the 
default rates of individuals who accept a loan offer may be higher than that of those who 
decline the offer, all other factors being equal (Phillips and Raffard 2009). Adverse selec-
tion is thought to be the result of information asymmetry. Credit bureau reports and 
public records, which lenders use as input for credit risk and response models, may not 
reflect the circumstances and immediate financial needs of the borrower. Additionally, 
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there may be subtle relationships between price elasticity and adverse selection (Oliver 
and Thaker 2013).
A portfolio manager may view a subset of the consumer population as homogenous 
as a result of the observable information available to him. However, private information 
held by individuals in the population subset differentiate their risk profiles. Portfolio 
managers do not have access to such private information. It would then seem obvious 
that reducing the information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders will result 
in more targeted marketing of credit products with appropriate rates. Typically, pub-
lic information used by portfolio managers are those that are input into scorecards, i.e., 
financial, demographic and other personal information. The flat maximum effect indi-
cates that, given roughly the same inputs, there is little difference in the performance of 
scorecards constructed using a variety of modeling approaches (Overstreet et al. 1992), 
i.e., new data sources or new variables need to be found in order to improve scorecard 
performance.
An important line of research in human decision making is bounded rationality. 
Bounded rationality describe how a decision is made rather than the outcome of that 
decision (Selten and Gigerenzer 2002, p. 4). It is the idea that decision makers are limited 
by the available information, time, cognitive ability, and the manageability of the prob-
lem. Humans use heuristics to make decisions, which are simple rules, but often lead 
to decision errors. Kahneman and Tversky were among the first to establish cognitive 
basis for errors arising from decision heuristics [see Tversky and Kahneman (1973) and 
Tversky and Kahneman (1974)]. Limited cognitive ability and incomplete information 
are some of the reasons for errors in decision making by human subjects. Many experi-
ments have been conducted to reveal the decision heuristics used by human subjects in 
various classes of decision problems [see Winkler and Murphy (1973) for more]. Given 
the diversity in the decision heuristics used by human subjects, this forms a new source 
of data that may be used to improve scorecard performance.
One particular class of decision problems is the sequential decision problem in which 
agents are required to make a sequence of binary decisions. Sequential decision prob-
lems are of particular interest to consumer lending because consumers are often faced 
with a sequence of loan offers for which they make take/no take decisions. In this paper, 
we postulate that inference about the decision heuristics used by consumers when 
accepting or rejecting a loan offer may provide a new source of information for lenders. 
For example, decision heuristics could provide added information on borrower take/no-
take behavior, thereby reducing the information asymmetry between lenders and bor-
rowers. In particular, we show how observation of early decisions in a sequence can be 
informative about later decisions and can, when coupled with a type of adverse selec-
tion, also inform credit risk.
The paper is organized as follows. “Adverse selection” section extends the definition 
of adverse selection from Oliver and Thaker (2013) to a sequential offer setting that will 
serve as the basis for further study of the borrower’s decision process. “Bounded ration-
ality” section discusses bounded rationality in human decision making and reviews lit-
erature on categorizing agents by their sequential decision making behavior. “Problems 
involving sequential decisions in lending” section introduces two sequential decision 
problems in the consumer lending space. The first decision problem relates to auction 
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mechanisms for peer-to-peer lending. Lenders cognizant of decision heuristics in the 
context of consumer lending may offer a lower bid rate and, hence, win the bidding pro-
cess. We derive policy implications for a marketplace desirous of increasing borrowers’ 
utility through lower interest rates. The second decision problem, set in the context of 
direct mail, is that of a lender required to choose when to market offers relative to the 
competition. We show how the lender may incorporate information learned about the 
decision heuristics of individual consumers. “Conclusion” section offers concluding 
remarks and suggestions for further research.
Adverse selection
In this section, we introduce basic notations, followed by the mathematical definition of 
adverse selection. We then extend notions of adverse selection to timing adverse selec-
tion (TAS) and provide motivation for the study of consumers’ decision making process 
in the consumer lending space.
Suppose a portfolio manager has access to a homogenous population to which a credit 
product is marketed. We say a population is homogenous when members of the pop-
ulation have no observable differences between them. We use vector x to denote past 
behavioral, financial and demographic information about each member of this popula-
tion and only denotes information observable by the lender. We call x, the characteris-
tics vector. The portfolio manager makes an offer of credit with rate r. Once an offer is 
made, some subset of the population, the Take population, will accept the offer and open 
an account. Let T denote the event that an individual takes up an offer; so Tc is the event 
the individual declines the offer.
Suppose this is a simple loan account, where a unit of loan is lent to each account 
holder, and the account holder is required to repay the unit of loan plus the interest on 
the loan, 1+ r, at the end of a specified time period. We assume there are only two 
mutually exclusive and exhaustive performance outcomes, G and B. The event G is asso-
ciated with a Good customer, being one who does not default within the specified time 
period and repays the loan in full. The event B denotes the performance of a Bad cus-
tomer, being one who is not Good. We denote the probability of default for a borrower 
with characteristic vector and offer rate r as p(B|x, r). The conditional probability of 
default for the Take population is then written as p(B|T , x, r).1
Oliver and Thaker (2013) define adverse selection as
Equation 1 states the probability of a member in the Take population defaulting is higher 
than the probability of default in the general population, i.e., both the Take and Non-
Take population. We use the total probability theorem to obtain the Bads among the 
Non-Takes, i.e.,
1 At each instance of an offer, a homogenous subset of the total population (i.e., conditioned on the characteristic vector) 
offered the same rate (i.e., one rate at each instance of offer) will have some who take up the offer and some who do not. 
This take-up of an offer (or not taking up an offer) may be a result of unobservable information (i.e., unobservable to the 
portfolio manager). One may think of the random variable T as a function of some unobservable information provided 
by the take action that is independent of the characteristic vector and rate.
(1)p(B|T , x, r) > p(B|x, r).
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Following (Oliver and Thaker 2013), Bayes’ rule can relate the conditional probability of 
Bad of a Take to the conditional probability of Take by a Bad, i.e.,
Since, p(T |x, r)+ p(Tc|x, r) = 1, combining Eqs.  1 and 2 results in the following 
inequality:
Equation 4 indicates the Non-Take population have a higher credit quality than the total 
population.
In defining Eq. 4, we assumed the portfolio manager makes a one-time offer of credit. 
Suppose instead of a one-time offer strategy, the portfolio manager markets repeatedly. 
At each of a finite number of epochs, the manager has the option to market to individu-
als who have not previously taken an offer. Below we show that, due to adverse selection, 
the credit quality of those not-taking up any prior offers improve after every marketing 
instance.
From Eqs. 1 and 3, it follows that,
where Ti is the random variable indicating take-up at the ith offer and ri is the offer-rate 
in the ith marketing instance. It follows from Eqs. 4 and 5, that the credit quality of the 
non-take population after the first marketing instance is higher than the credit quality 
of the population prior to the first marketing instance, i.e., p(B|Tc1 , x, r1) < p(B|x, r1) , 
where Tci  indicates the event a borrower declines the ith offer. Suppose the portfolio 
manager markets a second time to those who did not take up the offer in the first mar-
keting instance. It follows from Eqs. 1 and 3 that,
where ri is a vector of all past and current offers, i.e., ri = {r1, r2, . . . , ri}.
Equations 4 and 6 can both be generalized for the ith marketing instance, i.e.,
and
Note that Eqs. 7 and 8 are extensions of Eqs. 1 and 3. Equation 7 implies that due to 
adverse selection, the credit quality of successive non-take population improves after 
each marketing instance. This is due to the higher probability of Take among Bads than 
(3)
p(B|T , x, r)
p(B|x, r)
=
p(T |B, x, r)
p(T |x, r)
.
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the general population at each marketing instance. Furthermore, Eq.  8 indicates there 
is a time component to adverse selection. We call this time dependent characteristic of 
adverse selection, timing adverse selection (or TAS). Note, thus far the vector of offer 
rates in ri has not been specified.
Suppose some members of a marketed population decline all prior offers, it follows from 
Eq. 8,
It follows since p(Ti|Tc1 , . . . ,Tci−1, x, ri) ≥ 0, the probability of take-up for Bads is strictly 
positive and is greater than the probability of take-up among the general population. In 
such a scenario where some members of a marketed population decline all prior offers, 
there is a positive probability at each marketing instance of a Bad declining all prior offers 
and taking up the latest offer, i.e.,
Thus far, we have shown that given sequential offers, there is a positive probability at each 
marketing instance of Bads declining all prior offers and taking up the latest offer. This is 
derived from notions of adverse selection (see Eq. 1) as discussed in Oliver and Thaker 
(2013). However, Eq.  2 may be shown through an alternative classifier such as logistic 
regression built using the characteristic vector, past offers and performance data from a 
dataset built from an experiment. In order to create this data set, a portfolio manager 
requires access to a homogenous population. Given a homogenous population with char-
acteristic vector, x, a portfolio manager may make a sequence of offers, where each offer in 
the sequence is only made to the subset of the population who decline all previous offers. 
Using this data, the portfolio manager may estimate the probability of Take and Bad given 
past declines, i.e., p(Ti ∩ B|Tc1 , . . . ,Tci−1, x, ri) through a logistic regression scorecards.2 If 
p(Ti ∩ B|T
c
1 , . . . ,T
c
i−1, x, ri) > 0, it follows that p(Ti|B,Tc1 , . . . ,Tci−1, x, ri) > 0 (i.e., Eq. 2).
Equation is in line with observations of real-life subjects faced with sequential decision 
making problems in the context of consumer lending. Observations have shown homog-
enous subjects taking up offers at different instances of a sequence. In the next section, 
we take a borrower’s view of receiving a sequence of offers and discuss the decision heu-
ristic observed in similar sequential decision making problems.
Bounded rationality
In “Adverse selection” section, we considered the case of a portfolio manager repeat-
edly marketing a credit product to a non-take population. The non-take population 
is updated after every offer is made. We showed under Oliver and Thaker’s definition 
of adverse selection [see Oliver and Thaker (2013)], the credit quality of the non-take 
population improves monotonically with marketing instance and that there is a timing 



























2 In order to estimate this probability, the portfolio manager requires all information regarding every offer made to each 
potential borrower. This requires each potential borrower to reveal every offer made by all institutions. The portfolio man-
ager may make credit cards offers to a set of potential borrowers through direct mail channel, while incentivizing these 
potential borrowers to reveal offers from competitive institutions, whether these competitors offers were taken up or not. 
Credit performance of taken-up offers may be observed in credit bureau data.
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Suppose now we take a borrower’s view. A borrower receives a sequence of offers from 
a lender. We assume the offer expires before the next offer arrives. As each offer arrives, 
the borrower is required to make a decision on whether to take the offer. If an offer not 
taken, the borrower waits for the next offer. When rejecting an offer, the borrower risks 
the chance of receiving only lower quality offers in the future. A broad set of litera-
ture indicates that humans do not necessarily make rational decisions when faced with 
sequential decision problems, in part because of our bounded ability to take in informa-
tion and limited cognitive abilities. Such limitations are known as bounded rationality. 
Bounded rationality may explain why homogenous borrowers accept credit offers at dif-
ferent point of time when faced with a sequence of offers. We provide an example, in the 
form of a well-studied problem known as the secretary problem, of how human subjects 
make decisions in a sequential decision problem setting.
Decision heuristics
The secretary problem, also known as the dowry problem, is a well-studied sequential 
decision problem involving optimal stopping theory. The secretary problem in its sim-
plest form is as follows (Ferguson 1989). Suppose a manager wishes to fill a secretarial 
position. There is only one such position available, for which there are N applicants. The 
manager is aware of the number of applicants. We assume the applicants can be rank-
ordered from best to worst candidates without ties. The applicants are then interviewed 
sequentially and in a random fashion. Once an applicant is interviewed, the manager 
is required to make a decision to hire the applicant or not. If the applicant is hired, no 
further interviews takes place. However if the applicant is not hired, the decision maker 
interviews the next candidate. Rejected applicants cannot be recalled. The objective of 
the manager is to hire the best possible applicant. After each interview, the manager 
faces a trade-off, i.e., the manager could hire the current interviewee and risk the chance 
that a better applicant would have arrived later on in the interview process, or not hire 
the current interviewee but no higher quality applicant arrives later.
The optimal solution can be described using the idea of a candidate. An applicant is 
a candidate if he or she is the best applicant interviewed thus far. The optimal solution 
is then for the manager to reject the first h− 1 applicants, some integer h ≥ 1, and then 
choose the next candidate (Ferguson 1989). Let N denote the number of applicants. For 
N > 1, the probability of selecting the best applicant is,
The optimal solution is h∗ = argmaxtφN (t). This is easily solved for small values of N. As 
N →∞ , h∗ = N/e (Ferguson 1989). It follows that for large values of N, it is approxi-
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next applicant better than all previously interviewed applicants. The probability of suc-
cessfully choosing the best candidate is approximately 36.8% [see Ferguson (1989), and 
Gilbert and Mosteller (2006) for more]. Stewart (1981) extended the secretary problem 
to one where the number of options is unknown. Under the assumption arrival times of 
each option is independent and identically distributed exponential random variable, the 
probability of choosing the best candidate with such a policy is 1/e, which is the asymp-
totic optimal probability value for when the length is known (Stewart 1981).
Because of bounded rationality and behavioral biases, humans do not necessarily make 
decisions in a rational manner. Experiments in decision making with real-life subjects 
have shown diverse decision making heuristics. A field experiment by Seale and Rapo-
port (1997) is particularly important because it demonstrates that when people were 
presented with the secretary problem, they did not generally behave optimally but rather 
in fashions that could be explained as mixtures of three decision heuristics, each with a 
parameter. The decision making strategies reported by Seale and Rapoport (1997) are:
1. Cutoff rule Reject the first h− 1 applicants and then hire the next candidate.
2. Successive non-candidate rule Hire the first candidate who follows h successive non-
candidate applicants since the last candidate.
3. Candidate counting rule Hire the hth candidate.
Note that of the three decision rules, only the cutoff rule is optimal, and then only if the 
correct parameter is chosen. Seale and Rapoport (1997) observed that human subjects 
seemed to follow a mixture of rules, with mixture weights and parameter values varying 
across individuals.
We speculate that multiple decision heuristics are in use by individuals responding to 
sequential credit offers. Such decision heuristics found among borrowers might explain 
why timing adverse selection occurs in practice. Furthermore, values for heuristics 
parameters might correlate with notions of patience on the part of the borrow, an idea 
explored below.
Credit hunger
In a field experiment with low to moderate income households, Meier and Sprenger 
(2010) tested whether time preferences can explain credit behavior. They measured time 
preferences of individuals through choice experiments. The choice experiment outcomes 
were then matched to credit report and tax return data. After controlling for dispos-
able income and other characteristics, less patient individuals were found to have lower 
credit scores and higher default rates. While Meier and Sprenger’s field experiment did 
not control for credit score, we posit that even when individuals do not have any observ-
able differences, impatient consumer behaviors lead to higher default risk. We call this 
credit hunger.
If, as we speculate, credit hunger exists in consumer credit populations, there would 
be value in recognizing individuals with that characteristic. Methods for learning deci-
sion strategies from the observation of actions could provide such an ability. In the next 
section, we introduce recent work in machine learning that addresses related problems.
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Behavior‑based agent recognition
Suppose there exists a set of decision heuristics, similar to those observed by Seale and 
Rapoport (1997), governing consumers’ decision making processes. Any lender that 
could gain the ability identify the decision heuristics being used by individual borrowers 
might then be able to achieve an advantage in lending strategy, relative to competitors 
without that ability. Recent work in machine learning has addressed a class of problems 
called behavior-based agent recognition (BAR), which center on the recognition of deci-
sion strategies (or the identity of agents) based on observation of decisions made by 
agents in sequential problems.
Qiao and Beling (2013) address the BAR problem by modeling the decision problem 
faced by agents as a Markov decision process (MDP). They use inverse reinforcement 
learning (IRL) to the learn the reward vector of the MDP from the observed actions of 
the agents. The reward vector is, in turn, used as the feature space for supervised and 
unsupervised learning of decision agent identities. On several problems, feature spaces 
constructed from rewards learned from IRL outperform those constructed directly from 
observed actions (Qiao and Beling 2013). For the secretary problem, Qiao and Beling 
(2013) conduct a simulation experiment in which a distinct base parameter value was 
applied to each heuristics rule from Seale and Rapoport (1997). In addition, random 
noise was added to actions of the decision agents. The feature space learned from IRL 
resulted in clusters with high-accuracy relative to ground truth. The method did not 
require inputs on any description of the decision heuristics as a basis for recognition.
Suppose historical data of consumers’ accept/reject decisions for a sequence of offers 
was available, including related historical account performance. In such a scenario, using 
Qiao and Beling’s IRL model-based method, it might be possible to cluster consumers 
based on their decision heuristics. In addition, using the historical account performance, 
one could relate risk and response behavior to individual decision heuristics as well as 
the historical proportion of the borrower population using each decision heuristics. 
Furthermore, in identifying decision heuristics of historical population, distribution of 
parameter values for each decision heuristics could be estimated. A portfolio manager 
with access to such information might then incorporate his knowledge of the borrowers’ 
decision heuristics in the consumer loan offer strategy.
In the next section, we discuss the impact of decision heuristics and parameter value 
information on a lender’s decision.
Problems involving sequential decisions in lending
In this section, we introduce two sequential decision problems found in consumer loan 
settings. In the first problem, we introduce the lending process in a social lending plat-
form, where lenders offer loans to borrowers through a bidding process. We model the 
offer policies of portfolio managers cognizant of notions of credit hunger and the result-
ing impact on the final-rate offered to the borrower. Whereas in the first problem, lend-
ers were merely cognizant of credit hunger, in the second problem we assume lenders 
have access to greater information such as the distribution of decision heuristics and the 
distribution of heuristics parameter values found in a borrower population. The portfo-
lio manager is required to decide whether to market a credit product to a homogenous 
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population. We assume each member of the marketable population receives a sequence 
of offers until an offer is taken-up by that member. The portfolio manager is required to 
decide whether to market in one of the instances of the offer sequence, and is required to 
decide on the offer rate if the product is marketed.
Social lending
Social lending offers an avenue for consumers to borrow money outside of the tradi-
tional banking system, where money is borrowed from lenders wanting to earn higher 
rates on their investment than through other accessible investment vehicles. Typically, 
these lenders are consumers. An internet marketplace provides the platform to bring 
together borrowers and lenders in order to benefit both parties. Such lending practices 
having been growing in many markets. In the United States, Peer-to-peer lending 
crossed the $1 billion in outstanding loan amount in 2012.3 In China, regulatory tighten-
ing of bank credit has resulted in the growth of peer-to-peer social lending.4 Generally, 
potential borrowers register on a social lending site, and list both their details and loan 
requirement. Lenders, then compete to provide the loan at a competitive rate. The mar-
ketplace specifies the mechanism from which the rates are set with different rate setting 
mechanisms used by different marketplaces. Until recently, an auction mechanism for 
rate setting was used by the largest marketplace in the United States, Prosper.com. In 
this section, we model the impact of credit hunger on the offer rates in a social lending 
setting with an auction mechanism.
Prosper is the first peer-to-peer lending marketplace in the United States, currently 
with over two million members and $692 million of funded loans.5 Prosper offers unse-
cured loans with fixed rates. The loans are fully amortized over the lending periods of 3 
or 5  years. Prosper’s current mechanism works as follows. A borrower creates a loan 
request, specifying the purpose of loan and the loan amount. A customers specific inter-
est rate is calculated using Prosper’s internal models and listed for potential lenders to 
view. Lenders then compete to provide portions of the loan on first-come basis. This is 
known as a posted-price mechanism.6 Prior to December 20, 2010, Prosper followed the 
auction model in setting the lending rate. In this mechanism, the borrower lists an 
amount and a reserve rate. The reserve rate is the maximum rate, she is willing to take 
on for the loan. Lenders then bid on both the loan amount and an offer rate. At the close 
of the bidding process, the loan application is considered successful if the total loan 
amount bid by the lenders is no less than the requested amount. Only lenders bidding 
lower offer rates than the requested reserve rate are considered in determining the total 
loan amount. This mechanism is a uniform price mechanism where each winning lender 
receives the same rate.
In Prosper’s auction mechanism, the lending process has a 2-week bidding period. 
However, the borrower has the option to either close the bidding process once the total 
loan amount bid by the lenders reaches the requested amount level, or wait until the 
3 http://techcrunch.com/2012/05/29/peer-to-peer-lending-crosses-1-billion-in-loans-issued/.
4 http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-07-23/china-shadow-bankers-go-online-as-peer-to-peer-sites-boom.html.
5 http://www.prosper.com/about/. Data accessed on the 14th of February, 2014.
6 http://www.lendacademy.com/prosper-com-ending-their-auction-process-dec-19th/. Accessed on the 28th of Febru-
ary, 2014.
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end of the official bidding period. We note that there is a de-facto signalling process that 
occurs when a borrower does not close their position immediately after the requested 
loan amount level has been reached. The observation that a borrower has not closed the 
position allows for lenders to lower their bid in recognition of possible lower default risk 
of the borrower.
The Prosper auction environment provides a natural environment to study tim-
ing adverse selection, particularly credit hunger. We show credit hunger has policy 
implications for a social lending marketplace wishing to provide greater benefits to 
the borrower. Chen et al. (2013) analyzed Prosper’s mechanism as a game of complete 
information that fully characterizes the Nash equilibria found in such mechanisms. In 
contrast, we demonstrate that the provision of providing the lender with incremental 
information relating to credit hunger may result in lower rates for lower risk borrowers.
Notation, bidding process and Nash equilibrium
In this section, we define notation and the basic model required to understand the Nash 
equilibrium rates when lenders are cognizant of credit hunger.
We follow Ceyhan et al. (2011) in modeling the bidding process as a three time step 
process. Suppose a borrower wants to borrow an amount D and specifies a reserve inter-
est rate of R. Both D and R are publicly listed on the borrower’s listing at time t = 0 . 
Each competing lender, Li, specifies the amount she is willing to lend, ai and her bid rate, 
bi. Once the total loan amount bid by the lenders with bi ≤ R, exceeds the requested 
amount, the borrower has the option to stop the bidding process. We consider this time 
t = 1. All winners are announced at this point. If the borrower does not stop the bidding 
process, the lending process carries on until time t = 2, which is the maximum allow-
able time specified by the marketplace. In our model, we restrict each lender to bid at 
most once between time step 0 and 1. Note, time length between t = 0 and t = 1 varies 
for each lending process. Between time t = 1 and t = 2, any lenders not in a winning 
position may lower their rate bid in order gain a winning position. As each lender bids 
a lower rate, the latest leading lenders are announced. We assume each lender, Li has a 
private rate, ri which is the lowest rate she is willing to bid based on the characteristics of 
the borrower. Between time t = 1 and t = 2, lenders may only lower their bid if each bid 
increases their utility ui = xi(p− ri), where xi is the loan amount bid by lender Li and p 
is the winning rate. In this section, we drop all notions of a characteristics vector since 
we talk of one borrower. We assume each lender’s private rate is a function of the credit 
risk of the borrower. Once a lender is declared a winner any time during the process, she 
may not pull out of the bidding process. The goal of each lender is to increase their util-
ity. Our goal is to characterize the Nash equilibrium price when lenders are cognizant of 
credit hunger.
For completeness, we provide the definition of Nash equilibrium.
Definition 1 (Nash equilibrium) (Chen et al. 2013) A bid profile b = (b1, . . . , bn) is a 
Nash equilibrium if no lender can increase her utility by unilaterally changing her bid, 
that is keeping the bids of other lenders fixed.
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In the bidding process, the following allocation rules specifies the amount of loan allo-
cated to each lender.
Definition 2 (Allocation rules, last winner and first loser) (Chen et  al. 2013) 
Given a bid profile b = (b1, . . . , bn), order lenders such that bi ≤ bi+1 for all i. Let 
k = min{j|
∑j
i=1 ai ≥ D, j = 1, . . . , n}. The allocation is defined as xi = ai for i < k, 
xk = D −
∑k−1
i=1 ai and xi = 0 for i > k, where xi is the amount borrowed from lender Li . 
We refer to Lk as the last winner and Lk+1 as the first loser. Let  be the list of winners 
when all lenders bid their true rate. We denote α and α + 1 as the index of the last win-
ner and first loser in .
Note that 
∑
i xi = D. In Prosper’s mechanism, the lending rate, p = rk when the last 
winner Lk does not fully utilize her budget (i.e., xk < ak), and p = rk+1 when the last 
winner Lk+1 fully utilizes her budget.
In addition, we require the following definition in order to define the price p in a Nash 
equilibrium.
Definition 3 (β) (Chen et  al. 2013) Suppose we order all lenders indexed in a non-
decreasing order of their true interest rates. For each Łj ∈ , let Lβ be the last winner in 
 when the set of lenders is restricted to {L1, . . . , Lj−1, Lj+1, . . . , Ln}, i.e., it is the smallest 
index k such that 
∑k
i=1,i �=j ai ≥ D. Define β = maxLj∈�βj.
Chen et al. (2013) provide bounds for the final price p.
Lemma 1 (Chen et  al. 2013) The price p in any Nash equilibrium b satisfies 
rα+1 ≤ p ≤ rβ. Furthermore, p = rj for some Lj with rα+1 ≤ rj ≤ rβ.
Note that in a Nash equilibrium, there is a finite set of prices which p can hold.
Suppose Nash equilibrium is reached at time t = 1. Assuming no lender may pull 
out of a winning bid, a borrower’s winning rate cannot worsen between time t = 1 and 
t = 2 . Since the winning rate may not worsen, the borrower does not face any trade-off 
in terms of the loan-rate. It would seem obvious that a borrower should remain in the 
bidding process in the hope of a lower loan-rate. However, credit hungry borrowers may 
close the bidding process at t = 1 and the winning rate at t = 1 is the final loan rate. On 
the other hand, a borrower who does not close the bidding process provides an opportu-
nity for the lenders to bid a lower rate.
Nash equilibrium rates
Suppose some of the participating lenders are cognizant of credit hunger. We assume 
such lenders perceive the borrower’s action as a signal of a lower borrower risk profile 
and hence, revise their bidding rates.
Now, we consider the case of one participating lender who is cognizant of notions of 
credit hunger. Suppose lender Lk is aware of credit hunger and has an initial rate of r0k 
at time t = 0. Suppose at time t = 1, the borrower does not close the bidding process. 
This signals to the lender Lk that the borrower is less risky than previously thought and 
hence, the cognizant lender revises her private rate downwards. Let r1k denote the new 
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rate at time t = 1 with r1k < r0k. Let p1 and p2 be the winning rate at time t = 1 and t = 2 
respectively. We consider the following cases:
Suppose r1k < p1 < r0k. Since p1 < r0k, the cognizant lender is not in a winning posi-
tion at time t = 1. However, she may revise her rate down to p1 − ǫ for some ǫ > 0 in 
order to move into a winning position and hence increase her utility. This re-bidding 
process dislodges the last winner at time t = 1. If the previously winning lender had bid 
her true rate between time t = 0 and t = 1, the process stops and p2 = p1 − ǫ. If the 
winning lender at time t = 1 had not bid her true rate, then the auction process contin-
ues between those who have not bid their true rate and the cognizant lender, resulting in 
lower final rate for the borrower, i.e., p2 < p1.
Suppose p1 = r0k, then lender Lk is the last winner. She will then lower her bid only if it 
results in greater utility through greater allocation of the loan to her.
Suppose p1 ≥ r0k. In this scenario, the cognizant lender will not revise her rate as any 
revision will have no impact on her utility as the winning rate is set by another lender.
Suppose instead, p1 ≤ r1k. Since r1k < r0k, the cognizant lender is in a winning position 
at time t = 1, but is not the lender setting the final rate. Any lowering of her bidding rate 
will not result in an allocation change. It follows that the winning lenders at time t = 1 
remain the winning lenders at time t = 2.
In the above example, only one lender was cognizant of credit hunger. In such a case, 
notions of credit hunger will only affect the final rate if the cognizant lender gains by 
lowering her rate and increase her utility in the process. This has policy implications for 
marketplaces wanting to benefit borrowers through lower final rates. For example, such 
marketplaces can set training policies to increase awareness of credit hunger. If more lend-
ers are cognizant of credit hunger, those lenders may revise their bidding rates down for 
a patient borrower. This will result in greater situations where r1i < p1 ≤ r0i  and thereby 
increasing the probability of lowering the final lending rates between time t = 1 and t = 2.
Direct mail lender’s decision problem
In “Social lending” section, we showed if a lender is cognizant of credit hunger, this may 
result in a lower winning loan rate. Suppose instead, lenders had access to greater infor-
mation such as access to historical data on credit offer decisions for consumers who 
were required to make decisions on a sequence of credit offers as well as their respec-
tive account performance data. The lender may then forecast the distribution of decision 
heuristics found in a potential borrower population and incorporate such information 
in the lending decisions. In this section, we discuss the impact of such forecasts on a 
lender’s decision in a direct mail setting.
Problem definition
We setup the lender’s decision problem as follows. Suppose a lender has access to 
a homogenous population and wishes to market credit offers. Since the popula-
tion is a homogenous population, we do not include the characteristic vector x in our 
analysis. The lender is required to decide whether to market or not to the population 
on the ith instance in a sequence of offers. If the lender decides to market on the ith 
instance then the lender is required to set the ith offer rate with a single objective of 
maximizing expected profit. The lender also has access to a historical database of similar 
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homogenous consumer population with information on sequence of past offers and the 
respective consumers’ decisions on those credit offers. In addition, the lender has access 
to related historical account performance data.
A lender with access to borrowers’ historical offer decision data may apply the BAR 
method on the data and categorize borrowers into groups, with each group associated 
with a single decision heuristics. Suppose all decision heuristics are ordered in some 
manner. Let ψj = ψj(hj) denote decision heuristics j with heuristics parameter hj. In 
order to simplify our model, we define a candidate offer. A candidate offer is one that 
consumers prefer to rates on past offers. Since consumers prefer lower loan offer rates to 
higher rates, candidate offers are lower rates than all past offers’ rates. We assume under 
each decision heuristics, only candidate offers are taken up by borrowers. Given histori-
cal data, the portfolio manager is able to estimate in a population, the probability of a 
borrower in a population using decision rule j, i.e., p(ψj); and the conditional probabil-
ity of a borrower using parameter value hj = k, i.e., p(hj = k|ψj). Similarly, the portfolio 
manager may estimate default probability of a borrower conditioned on decision heuris-
tic ψj, parameter hj and Take, i.e., p(B|ψj , hj ,T ), where the random variable T indicates 
the event an account was opened.
The decision to take up an offer by a member of the population is dependent on the 
decision heuristics, the associated parameter, and a history of past and current offer 
rates. The decision heuristics and the heuristics parameter drives the cognitive pro-
cess, while the sequence of offers determines the offer experience of the decision maker. 
In order to estimate the take rates, a sequence of offers must be specified. Let ri indi-
cate a sequence of i offers with ri the last offer. Hence, the probability of a Take con-
ditioned on decision heuristics, the associated parameter, and a history of past and 
current offer rates may be estimated from the historical database, i.e., p(Ti|ri,ψj , hj) . 
Suppose the last offer ri is not a candidate offer, i.e., ri ≥ mini[r1, r2, . . . , ri−1]. Since 
all offers accepted by a consumer are candidates, it follows that p(Ti|ri,ψj , hj) = 0 
∀ψj , hjandri ≥ mini[r1, r2, . . . , ri−1].
Lender’s decision
The lender is required to make a decision on whether to make an ith offer in a sequence 
of offers. We assume the lender is only able to market on the ith offer. If the lender makes 
an offer, he is then required to set the offer rate. In order to optimize on the lender’s 
objective of maximizing expected profit, we require an expected profit function. Sup-
pose the lender markets an offer rate of ri in a sequence of offers ri. For each loan unit, 
the lender earns (1+ ri) from each borrower who does not default. It recovers De(1− fD) 
from each bad account, where De is the exposure of default and fD is the fractional loss 
given default, with fD > 0. Following (Rajaratnam et  al. 2010; Beling et  al. 2010), we 
make the simplifying assumption De = 1 in order to ensure the recovered amount is 
less than the original unit loan. We assume the lender funds the loan through debt with 
rate rB. Furthermore, the cost of marketing to a single borrower is C. It follows that the 
expected profit conditional on take is,
E[P|ri,Ti,ψj , hj] = (1 + ri)
[
1 − p(B|ψj , hj ,Ti)
]
+ (1 − fD)
[
p(B|ψj , hj ,Ti)
]
− (1 + rB)− C .
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Therefore,
Since the cost of marketing to a consumer who does not take-up the offer is C, it follows 
that the expected profit conditioned on a decision heuristics, ψj and parameter hj is,
It follows that, the expected profit condition on a sequence of offer ri is,
where p(hj|ψj) and p(ψj) are estimated from the historical database. Note, borrowers 
only take-up candidate offers. Since the lender’s objective is to maximize expected profit 
and since all offers that are taken-up are candidate offers, the lender solves the following 
maximization problem,
Suppose ri = r∗ is the profit maximizing rate, i.e., r∗ = argmaxri [E[P|ri]]. The lender 
markets in the ith instance if E[P|ri−1, r∗] ≥ 0.
Suppose r′ and r′′ are two possible candidate offers with r′ < r′′. Since E[P|ri] 
increases monotonically with respect to all candidate offers ri, it follows that 
E[P|ri−1, ri = r
′] < E[P|ri−1, ri = r
′′] for r′ < r′′, i.e., the lender prefers borrow-
ers to accept a product with a higher offer rate given all else equal. Given borrow-
ers will reject a non-candidate offer then the portfolio manager will offer a rate 
ri = mini[r1, r2, . . . , ri−1] − ǫ for some ǫ > 0. We may think of ǫ as the marginal improve-
ment in offers.
Note, since borrowers only take-up candidate offers, the rate set by the lender maxi-
mizing on expected profit is a candidate offer. We did not relate this to the quality of 
the candidate offer, i.e., the sequential decision model presented in this section seems 
to indicate a lower candidate offer rates does not attract more customers as would be 
expected in practice. The scenario presented here assumes the lender is cognizant of the 
order in which his offer lies within a sequence of offers. In our model, we assumed all 
consumers had received the same past offers prior to the current offer. In practice, when 
an offer is made, a lower offer rate attracts a higher take-up rate, i.e., the quality of the 
candidate offer affects the response rate. This may be attributed to each borrower receiv-
ing multiple offers from different lenders and hence, each borrower is at a different point 
on their sequences of offers.
Conclusion
This article extends the line of research in consumer lending to include the notion of 
sequential decision making. We use the definition of adverse selection presented by Oli-
ver and Thaker (2013) to introduce the notion of timing adverse selection. We explain 
E[P|ri,Ti,ψj , hj] = (ri − rB − C)
[
1 − p(B|ψj , hj ,Ti)
]
− (rB + fD + C)
[






























s.t. ri < mini [r1, r2, . . . , ri−1].
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this phenomenon through bounded rationality resulting in diverse decision heuristics 
used by consumers. Along with decision heuristics in consumer lending space, we intro-
duced the notion of credit hunger. This was followed by introducing a method used to 
cluster agents based on their decision heuristics—behavior-based agent recognition. 
Finally, the paper illustrated the impact of credit hunger and decision heuristics on two 
decision problems in the consumer lending space.
As with adverse selection, timing adverse selection is not easy to measure in practice. 
However, sequential decision making experiments in other settings provide evidence 
that humans employ diverse decision heuristics, and this in turn suggests the existence 
of timing adverse selection. In order to categorize historical borrowers into clusters of 
decision heuristics, both take and non-take decision information is required. While 
offers taken-up by borrowers are found in credit bureau records, to our knowledge lend-
ers do not share information on past declined offers. In addition, determining consumer 
lending decision heuristics requires an audit of offers, take behavior for all offers, and 
account performance for every offer accepted by a consumer.
While we have shown examples of the impact of timing adverse selection on a lender’s 
decision, field experiments and further research is required in order to understand the 
phenomena described in this paper. In testing timing adverse selection and in determin-
ing consumers’ decision heuristics, a sequence of offers need to made and consumers’ 
decisions recorded. Such a sequence of offers may be disrupted by other lenders mar-
keting their own products. The set of potential borrowers must then be incentivized to 
reveal all competitors’ offers whether they are taken up or not. Direct mail channels for 
credit cards lends itself to such an experiment.
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